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Ripe for Resolution: A Critique of
the Surveillance Post Privilege
By SHAWN SPAULDING*
"¢AN SOCIETY, HOWEVER committed to law, [must] be reminded
again and again that it is deadly to reach conclusions on secret, un-
tested evidence. From the French Revolution until today, the accuser
has used the shield of anonymity to work off grudges and hatreds. In
secrecy, there cannot be truth."' Covert surveillance posts are often
established in commercial or residential buildings located in high
crime areas to allow law enforcement to better observe drug deals.
2
When an alleged buyer or seller is prosecuted based on observations
made from a secret surveillance post, the government may withhold
the surveillance location from the defense by invoking the official in-
formation privilege. 3 Obtaining the exact location of the surveillance
site is important for several reasons: it may show: (1) whether the of-
ficer's view was obstructed; (2) whether the angle of the view made
the observation difficult; and (3) whether the officer's distance from
the alleged criminal transaction supports an allegation that he indeed
saw the transaction in detail.4
A defendant may request disclosure of the surveillance site, but
despite the potential for exoneration if the location were revealed,
there is only a remote possibility that such a request will be granted in
California. If a defendant is charged with sales or possession, and if no
evidence is found on the defendant, she is foreclosed from testing the
* Class of 2003. The author would like to dedicate this Comment to the memory of
Lorna Shivey, for her wisdom and encouragement. The author would also like to thank
Roy and Laura Spaulding for their love, and Rebecca Marcus for her zealous advocacy.
1. Max Rosenn, Presumed Guilty, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv. 535, 547 (1995) (quoting
Anthony Lewis, Time of the Assassins, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1989, at A31).
2. See Mark Hutchins, Protecting Surveillance Sites, POINT OF VIEW (Alameda County
District Attorney's Office), Winter 2001, at 19, available at http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/
da/pov/protectsurveillance.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2001).
3. The official information privilege also applies to disclosure of confidential infor-
mants and various documents and reports, such as accident reports and police records. See
CAL. EWD. CODE § 1040 (Deering 2001). In this Comment the surveillance post privilege is
also referred to as the surveillance privilege.
4. See United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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only evidence against her-the officer's veracity. This inability to test
the veracity, or capability, of the accusing officer implicates the consti-
tutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against the ac-
cused, as well as the right to due process and a fair trial. In California,
trial courts wield their discretionary powers in inconsistent procedural
practices. This has been exacerbated by the appellate courts, which
have analyzed nearly indistinguishable fact patterns, but have pro-
duced opposite conclusions of law based on the application of dispa-
rate standards. The California Supreme Court has not yet reconciled
these inconsistencies, which have been developing in the appellate
courts since 1988. Some scholars think this issue is now "ripe for
resolution."5
California's privilege is codified in Evidence Code section 1040,
which prohibits disclosure of a surveillance site if such disclosure is
against the public interest.6 The language of this section leaves the
courts much discretion in determining whether to compel discovery
of the secret surveillance post. The presiding judge must balance the
public interest in maintaining secrecy against a defendant's need for
disclosure in an in camera hearing,7 without the presence of defense
counsel. Even if the judge finds the privilege applicable, California's
Evidence Code section 1042 requires the judge to rule against the
prosecution if the surveillance location is material to the defendant's
guilt or innocence . A finding against the government, pursuant to
section 1042, would result in disclosure of the location or dismissal of
the charges.
The focus of this Comment is whether the California official in-
formation privilege, as it relates to drug prosecutions, impedes the
search for truth to the detriment of a defendant's constitutional
5. L. DOUGLAS PIPES & WILLIAM E. GAGENJR., CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DISCOVERY § 8:11
(2d ed. 1999).
6. This section provides:
Disclosure of the information is against the public interest because there is a ne-
cessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the
necessity for disclosure in the interest ofjustice; but no privilege may be claimed
under this paragraph if any person authorized to do so has consented that the
information be disclosed in the proceeding. In determining whether disclosure of
the information is against the public interest, the interest of the public entity as a
party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(b)(2) (Deering 1986).
7. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 915 (Deering Supp. 2002).
8. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1042(a) (Deering 1986) ("[I]f a claim of privilege . . . is
sustained in a criminal proceeding, the presiding officer shall make such order or finding
of fact adverse to the public entity bringing the proceeding as is required by law upon any
issue in the proceeding to which the privileged information is material.").
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rights. This Comment considers four aspects of the official informa-
tion privilege as it relates to covert surveillance locations in drug pros-
ecutions. Part I discusses the problems emanating from the
nondisclosure of the surveillance location. Part II presents a brief his-
tory of the privilege, an overview of the significant California cases,
and a comparison of the closely analogous issue of the confidential
informant privilege. Part III depicts in detail how the surveillance priv-
ilege unfolds in a pre-trial court proceeding. Part IV presents practical
suggestions for defense counsel in dealing with the surveillance privi-
lege. Finally, Part IV also proposes a solution for the future of the
surveillance privilege that introduces additional procedural
safeguards.
I. The Problem
The two major problems with nondisclosure of a surveillance lo-
cation are the denial of a defendant's right to cross-examination and
confrontation and the potential denial of the right to due process.
These problems are best illustrated through an example of a typical
surveillance case. People v. Alfaro9 is a quintessential example of an
"empty bust"10 in which the defendant was held to answer to a charge
of selling narcotics based on the testimony of the observing officer
without the ability to cross-examine as to the precise surveillance
location. 1
On November 3, 2000, Sergeant Yee of the San Francisco Police
Department conducted a surveillance operation from a covert loca-
tion in San Francisco.' 2 The surveillance took place at 1:04 p.m., at
which time there may have been precipitation or fog in the area.' 3
Sergeant Yee was eighty to ninety feet from Alfaro, using binoculars,
and there were many people in the area at the time. 14 There was also a
bus stop, a sign, stairs, trees, and many buildings in the area that could
have obstructed the officer's view.' 5 Alfaro was observed spitting some-
9. No. 180975 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000), appeal denied sub nom. Alfaro v. Superior
Court, No. A094599 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2001) (denying writ of prohibition for failure
to provide a record sufficient to enable informed appellate review).
10. See Rep. Tr. at 8:11-15 (Dec. 15, 2000). An empty bust is a narcotics sales arrest
where no drugs are recovered from the defendant.
11. See id. at 13:1-11 (Dec. 15, 2000).
12. See Rep. Tr. 3:28, 4:1-8 (Dec. 8, 2000).
13. See id. at 3:28, 17:3-14.
14. See Rep. Tr. at 10:8-12, 35:3-28 (Dec. 8, 2000); 7:11-15 (Dec. 15, 2000).
15. See Rep. Tr. at 3:10-14, 4:22-25 (Dec. 15, 2000); 36:12-15, 40:13-27, 40:28,
41:1-5, 41:13-20 (Dec. 8. 2000).
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thing from his mouth and handing the object to a woman. 16 Sergeant
Yee saw the woman take the object and give alleged paper currency to
Alfaro in return.1 7 The incident lasted only twenty seconds from the
time the woman approached Alfaro until they both walked away. 8
One rock of suspected crack cocaine was recovered from the woman
and Alfaro was arrested for the sale of narcotics. 19 No indicia of sales,
such as narcotics, a pager, or a cell phone, were found on Alfaro and
the only money recovered was inaccessible as it was in his tennis
shoe-between his foot and the bottom of his shoe. 20 At the prelimi-
nary hearing, the public defender was eventually allowed to question
Sergeant Yee regarding the height and distance from the alleged
transaction, but was denied the ability to establish whether any obsta-
cles existed. 2 1 Defense counsel also suggested alternatives to disclo-
sure but was denied those as well. 22 The judge sustained the
surveillance privilege after an in camera hearing and found that non-
disclosure did not deprive Alfaro of his constitutional rights to cross-
examination and due process. 23 The ruling was appealed via a writ of
prohibition, but it was denied because the record was insufficient to
enable informed appellate review. 24
The court's denial of Alfaro's right to cross-examination fore-
stalled his ability to establish the materiality of the surveillance loca-
tion. Alfaro was able to determine that it was not a sunny day, that
Sergeant Yee was eighty to ninety feet from the alleged transaction in
an elevated position using binoculars, and that the transaction lasted
twenty seconds. 25 However, there may have been fog or precipita-
tion. 26 Furthermore, although Sergeant Yee was eighty to ninety feet
away and in an elevated position, the defense was not allowed to estab-
16. See id. at 5:1-6, 20:3-22, 23:21-23.
17. See id. at 5:12-14, 28:6-13. It was contested whether the paper was currency.
18. See id. at 15:13-16.
19. See id. at 6:5-12, 31:12-14. Alfaro was charged by information with violating CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 with a CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.1 allegation, which is a
penalty enhancement for a felony committed while released from custody before final
judgment on a prior felony.
20. See Rep. Tr. at 5:26-28, 6:1, 31:22-24, 32:12-21 (Dec. 8, 2000).
21. See Rep. Tr. at 9:17-27, 10:16-19, 11:2-6 (Dec. 15, 2000).
22. See id. at 9:5-9. Alternatives included using photographs, videotape or disclosing
the location to a public defender investigator. Rep. Tr. at 38:17-23 (Dec. 8, 2000).
23. See Rep. Tr. at 37:25-28 (Dec. 8, 2000).
24. See Alfaro v. Superior Court, No. A094599 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2001).
25. See Rep. Tr. at 17:3-14, 10:8-12, 15:13-16 (Dec. 8, 2000); 7:14-17, 9:17-19 (Dec.
15, 2000).
26. See Rep. Tr. at 17:3-14 (Dec. 8, 2000).
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lish how the officer calculated the distance nor how high he was.27
The defense was also not allowed to inquire whether the officer was
using a radio, a fact which has been relevant in other California
cases.
28
As Alfaro's defense was a complete denial of the charges, the fact
that there were no indicia of sales recovered is relevant.29 In addition,
Sergeant Yee neither actually saw Alfaro spit a rock into his hand, nor
whether he actually handed it to the woman. 30 The rock recovered
from the woman was the size of a Tic-Tac, which would be hard to see
from any distance. 3 1 Sergeant Yee did not see where the money came
from, nor could he be certain that it was, in fact, money.32 While these
factors are not conclusive proof that the officer did not adequately
observe the transaction, they do suggest that his observation was not as
reliable as he professed it to be. Given the number of possible obstruc-
tions in the area, the lack of direct evidence, and the defendant's
complete denial of the charges, there was no way to test the officer's
veracity absent disclosure of the location. The court's denial of Al-
faro's right to cross-examination precluded him from testing the only
direct evidence against him.
It has been argued that the inability to cross-examine a material
witness is itself a violation of due process. 33 However, Alfaro's right to
due process was also violated by the lack of sufficient procedures to
ensure the adequate protection of his constitutional rights. The in
camera hearing was recorded for the sole purpose of enabling in-
formed appellate review, yet when the appellate court reviewed the
record, the hearing was found to be insufficient. 34 Because the in cam-
era hearing was an ex parte proceeding, defense counsel could not
participate. As an alternative to disclosure, defense counsel suggested
that the location be revealed to her investigator, without disclosing it
to the defendant, in order to test the officer's veracity.3 5 Even though
27. See Rep. Tr. at 9:20-28, 10:1-6 (Dec. 15, 2000).
28. See Rep. Tr. at 10:13-16 (Dec. 8, 2000); People v. Garza, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 14
(Ct. App. 1995).
29. See Rep. Tr. at 8:25-28 (Dec. 15, 2000).
30. See Rep. Tr. at 20:10-22, 23:21-23 (Dec. 8, 2000).
31. See id. at 24:3. Due to the size of the rock, ifAlfaro had another rock it easily could
have been disposed of without observation.
32. See id. at 27:12-28, 28:1-13.
33. See Rosenn, supra note 1, at 545.
34. See Alfaro v. Superior Court, No. A094599 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2001). Although
the record of the in camera hearing accompanied the writ, it was not provided under seal to
the judge who ruled on the § 995 motion.
35. See Rep. Tr. 9:5-9 (Dec. 15, 2000).
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some courts allow the use of such alternatives, the Alfaro court denied
all of the suggested alternatives to disclosure.3 6 Ultimately, due to the
lack of consistent procedures or standards, the denial of alternatives,
and the inability to cross-examine a material witness, Alfaro's due pro-
cess rights were violated when the court sustained the surveillance
post privilege.
H. Background
"Almost all the rules of evidence other than rules of privilege are
designed to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of the factfinding
process. Privileges have a different purpose .... Their effect in any
given trial may be to impede the search for truth."37 The surveillance
post privilege is derived from both statutory and case law. This section
addresses the history of the privilege and how it was initially applied to
drug prosecutions. This section also examines all California cases
which have since applied the privilege in similar situations. Many pro-
cedures and justifications for the surveillance post privilege were
adopted from the analogous privilege for confidential informants, so
a brief comparison of the privileges is also provided as background
information.
A. History of the Official Information Privilege
The official information privilege embodies two separate discov-
ery privileges: an absolute privilege and a conditional, or qualified,
privilege.38 The absolute privilege is applied if disclosure is specifically
forbidden by a federal or state statute.3 9 In all other instances where
governmental agencies refuse to disclose confidentially acquired in-
formation, the conditional privilege is invoked, requiring the court to
determine whether disclosure is against the public interest.40 Based
on the conditional privilege of section 1040, the court does not have
to require the prosecution to divulge a surveillance site if
36. See id. at 38:23 (Dec. 8, 2000).
37. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES:
TEXT CASES, AND PROBLEMS 871 (4th ed. 2000).
38. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040 (Deering 1986).
39. State law governs privileges in these circumstances. Substituting a single privilege
for thirteen previous rules, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 prescribes that in federal courts
government privileges shall "be governed by the principles of the common law.., in the
light of reason and experience." FED. R. EvD. 501. Under this rule of evidence "federal
courts retain their power to develop the common law privileges of witnesses... on a case-
by-case basis." United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1155 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
40. See County of San Diego v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1986).
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"[d] isclosure of the information is against the public interest because
there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the informa-
tion that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of jus-
tice."41 However, if the court finds that a surveillance location is
privileged, section 1042 requires the court to nonetheless make a find-
ing adverse to the prosecution if the location is material to the de-
fense. 42 Sections 1040 and 1042 were enacted in 1965 to replace
California Civil Procedure Code section 1881, which had been in ef-
fect since 1872. 4 3
While the surveillance post privilege has roots dating back to
1872, it has been applied to drug prosecutions only since 1988. In
1988, courts broadened the privilege to allow a surveillance site to
qualify as "information acquired in confidence." 44
Historically, the official information privilege arose in cases in-
volving state secrets or government documents, 45 but in 1988 the
court in Hines v. Superior Court46 held that section 1040 establishes a
"surveillance location privilege. ' 47 Official information is defined as
"information acquired in confidence by a public employee in the
course of his or her duty."48 In Hines, the defense argued that the
investigating officer "did not 'acquire' knowledge of the location from
which he was operating; he simply selected it, and chose to keep it
secret."4 The defense argued that the effect of the nondisclosure rul-
ing elevates any information that an officer obtains during an investi-
gation to official information. 50 The court rejected this argument as
too restrictive an interpretation of the statutory word "acquire."51 In-
stead, the court relied on the Webster's dictionary definition of "ac-
quire": "to come into possession of ... often by some uncertain or
41. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1040(b)(2) (Deering 1986).
42. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1042 (Deering 1986); People v. Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d
369, 374 (Ct. App. 1995). See also Hines v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30 (Ct. App.
1988) ("[T]he adverse finding is only required if the privileged information is materiaL").
43. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1881 (Deering Supp. 2002).
44. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(a) (Deering 1986).
45. See Samish v. Superior Court, 83 P.2d 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938) (stating that the
privilege protects public interests which may be injured by producing documents or re-
vealing facts in the government's possession).
46. 251 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30 (Ct. App. 1988). See also People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal.
Rptr. 779, 783 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Commonwealth v. Lugo, 503 N.E.2d 974, 976 (Mass.
Ct. App. 1987)).
47. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
48. CAL. EvIo. CODE § 1040(a) (Deering 1986).
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unspecified means."52 The Hines court held that the official informa-
tion privilege applied to surveillance locations by reason of the pur-
pose and plain meaning of the statutory text.53
Because application of the privilege to drug prosecutions is rela-
tively new in California jurisprudence, understanding the few cases
that have been reviewed on appeal is essential to understanding the
privilege.
B. Significant Surveillance Post Cases
In California, there are six published cases which have applied
the official information privilege to drug surveillances: 54 People v.
Haider,55 People v. Garza,56 In re Sergio M., 5 7 People v. Walker,58 Hines v.
Superior Court,5 9 and People v. Montgomery.60 In each of these cases the
privilege was invoked, the surveillance location was not disclosed, and
the defendant was convicted of selling narcotics. 61 In only two cases,
Hines and Montgomery, did an appellate court reverse the conviction
based on nondisclosure of the surveillance site. 62 Montgomery was re-
versed because of procedural insufficiencies with the in camera hear-
52. Id. (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary).
53. See id.
54. All recent cases involving the official information privilege as it is applied to covert
surveillance locations have been depublished or unpublished. See People v. Lockett, No.
C036813, 2002 WL 185948 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2002); People v. Landa, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d
836 (Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1997); In reArthur H., 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 3131 (Ct. App. Mar.
19, 2002); People v. Yepez, No. A093459, 2002 WL 236982 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002);
People v. Birkley, Nos. A089217 and A086947, 2001 WL 1663228 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28,
2001); People v. Medina, No. A093212, 2002 WL 313200 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2002);
People v. Jackson, No. F037364, 2002 WL 187389 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2002); People v.
Neves, Nos. H020613 and H023188, 2002 WL 66155 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2002) (relying
on surveillance cases to support disclosure of confidential informant); In re Harrell, Nos.
D021040 and D021315, 1995 WL 748083 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1995) (relying on surveil-
lance cases to support disclosure of confidential informant). In contrast, other cases apply-
ing the official information privilege to issues other than surveillance sites or confidential
informants have not been depublished or unpublished. See Michael P. v. Superior Court,
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11 (Ct. App. 2001); Marylander v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439
(Ct. App. 2000).
55. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369 (Ct. App. 1995), habeas corpus denied sub nom. Haider v. Direc-
tor of Corrections, 992 F. Supp. 1192 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
56. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11 (Ct. App. 1995).
57. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701 (Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 2245 (1995).
58. 282 Cal. Rptr. 12 (Ct. App. 1991).
59. 251 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Ct. App. 1988).
60. 252 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Ct. App. 1988).
61. See People v. Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369 (Ct. App. 1995); Garza, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d
11; In re Sergio M., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702; Walker, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 12; Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr.
at 29; Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
62. See Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr. 31; Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
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ing.63 Therefore, not since 1988, when Hines was decided, has an
appellate court reversed a drug sales conviction based exclusively on
nondisclosure of the surveillance site. 64 A brief summary of each case
is provided in this section to furnish distinguishing characteristics.
The facts of each case are similar in that an officer was in a covert
location when she observed the alleged drug transaction. Factual dif-
ferences, such as distance and possible obstructions, are summarized
in Table 1.
Hines v. Superior Court was the first, and remains the only, pub-
lished California appellate case to reverse a conviction based on fail-
ure to disclose the surveillance location. 65 In Hines, the defendant was
observed dealing drugs to passing motorists with the aid of a juvenile
who guarded the stash. 66 The surveillance privilege was invoked at the
preliminary hearing and the defendant moved to set aside the infor-
mation pursuant to section 995 of the Penal Code. 67 A hypodermic
needle was found on the defendant, but no drugs. 68 As there were no
drugs or other indicia of sales found on the defendant, the court held
the surveillance site was material to the defense and ordered the infor-
mation to be set aside.69
In People v. Montgomery the defendant repeatedly went into an in-
tersection to flag down cars, barking, "'Thai, I got Thai,' and forming
the letter 'T' with his hands. ' 70 When officers attempted to arrest
Montgomery after observing a sale, he fled into a building where of-
ficers heard him flushing a toilet.71 While nothing was observed
swirling in the toilet bowl, a bag containing a small amount of mari-
juana was recovered from within the tank.72 The court found no viola-
tion of the defendant's due process or confrontation rights. 73 As this
was one of the first surveillance cases to invoke section 1040, the court
responded by analogizing it to the confidential informant privilege.74
63. See Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
64. See Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 29.
67. See id. Penal Code section 995 allows the information to be set aside after a defen-
dant has been arraigned if the defendant was committed without reasonable or probable
cause. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (Deering 2001).
68. See Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
69. See id. at 31.
70. People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 780 (Ct. App. 1988).
71. See id. at 781.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 783.
74. See id. at 783-87.
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The Montgomery appellate court concluded that due to the distance of
twenty-five to thirty-five yards, the officer may have "been unable to
distinguish defendant's activities from the other suspects' activities. ' 75
Due to the small amount of marijuana recovered and because the only
direct evidence was the testimony of the officer, the court refused to
sustain the conviction. 76 The surveillance privilege was not challenged
until mid-trial, so the appellate court reversed the conviction due to
procedural insufficiencies without the resolution of the surveillance
privilege. 77
In People v. Walker, a buyer drove up to a courtyard, exited his car,
and conversed with the defendant. 7 The defendant then went inside
a building and returned with a small object, which the buyer put in his
shirt pocket.79 The privilege was challenged at trial and there was de-
tailed testimony from the officer that was corroborated in almost every
respect8 ° Walker admitted at trial that he had a conversation with the
"buyer" regarding purchasing drugs, but alleged that he referred the
buyer to someone else.81 Although the defendant denied making a
sale and disputed the officer's testimony regarding the officer's dis-
tance from the defendant, the court concluded the location was not
material because the officer had an unobstructed view from only fif-
teen feet away, under good lighting conditions.8 2
In In re Sergio M., ajuvenile defendant approached a car, spoke to
a passenger, and then retrieved a paper bag from behind a fence.83
He then removed a small plastic baggie from the paper bag and re-
turned the paper bag to its hiding place before appearing to sell the
baggie to the passenger. 84 Nearly every aspect of the officer's highly
detailed testimony was corroborated-a small baggie of marijuana was
found on the passenger and the marijuana stashed behind the fence
was found exactly where the officer claimed it was.8 5 The surveillance
privilege was challenged at a pre-trial, jurisdictional hearing.8 6 The
75. People v. Walker, 282 Cal. Rptr. 12, 18 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing People v. Mont-
gomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 784-86 (Ct. App. 1991)).
76. See Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
77. See id.




82. See id. at 17.
83. See In re Sergio M., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701, 702 (Ct. App. 1993).
84. See id. at 702-03.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 702.
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magistrate allowed the defense to pose questions for the in camera
hearing and accepted testimony from a defense investigator, which
allowed the magistrate to make an independent determination as to
whether the surveillance was obstructed.8 7 Sergio is almost identical to
Hines, yet the court did not require disclosure. This illustrates the dis-
parities between the courts of appeal. The magistrate concluded that
disclosure of the location was "absolutely essential," yet found the pub-
lic interest in protecting the location outweighed the defendant's
interests. 88
In People v. Garza, the defendant stood on a street corner attempt-
ing to flag down cars by yelling the word "coke." 89 The officer did not
observe an actual drug sale, but four bindles of cocaine were found on
the defendant.90 The court found it significant that the officer broad-
cast detailed descriptions of the defendant over a two-way radio while
observing him.91 It concluded that this would have been impossible if
the officer's view was obstructed in any meaningful way.92 As in Walker,
the privilege was challenged at trial and there was detailed testimony
from the officer that was corroborated in almost every respect.93 The
surveillance privilege challenge did not arise until the appeal, during
which the defendant claimed ineffectiveness of counsel.94 The court
found there was no prejudice because the remaining evidence was suf-
ficient to sustain the conviction. 95
The most recent surveillance case to be published in California,
People v. Haider,96 is significant because it is the only California case
heard on habeas corpus appeal to a federal court.97 The federal dis-
trict court held that there was no constitutional violation of the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right because the defense did
not demonstrate how disclosure might result in the defendant's exon-
eration.98 The defense was unable to show that there was any area of
the roof from which the view was obstructed. 99 Haider is similar to
87. See id. at 702-03.
88. Id.
89. People v. Garza, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 12 (Ct. App. 1995).
90. See id.
91. See id. at 14.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 14-15.
95. See id.
96. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369 (Ct. App. 1995).
97. See Haider v. Dir. of Corr., 992 F. Supp. 1192 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
98. See id. at 1193.
99. See id. at 1198.
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Montgomery in that the defense did not challenge the surveillance priv-
ilege until trial.100 Whereas Montgomery was reversed for procedural
inadequacies at the in camera hearing, the Haider conviction was up-
held on appeal. 10 1 The surveillance operation facts in Haider and
Hines are almost identical-the distance was comparable, binoculars
were used, and money was found on a co-defendant. 0 2 The only ap-
parent distinction between Haider and Hines is a sunny day. 103
Haider can be distinguished from most other surveillance cases in
that the court had the benefit of the defendant's testimony at trial,
where he admitted to being in the observed location, conducting a
drug transaction. 10 4 There was no factual dispute regarding obstruc-
tions-the only disagreement was over who made the sale. 10 5
C. The Confidential Informant Privilege
California and federal courts alike have compared the policy justi-
fications for the surveillance privilege to those used for upholding the
confidential informant privilege and have found them to be analo-
gous. 106 Although these privileges share similar statutory language
and purportedly share the same test for materiality, there are notable
distinctions, such as the various ways in which material witness testi-
mony is used in relation to both privileges. Furthermore, while the
disclosure of covert surveillance posts and the disclosure of confiden-
tial informants share many of the same policy considerations, such as
the interest in individual safety and the interest in preserving the fu-
ture utility of an informant or surveillance site, these policy considera-
tions do not apply equally to both privileges.
Before discussing the distinctions between the two privileges it is
important to examine their similarities. Analogizing the confidential
informant privilege to the surveillance post privilege is appropriate in
part because sections 1040 through 1042 of the Evidence Code apply
to both issues. Similar to section 1040 in surveillance cases, California
100. See id. at 1194-95; People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 781-82 (Ct. App. 1988).
101. See Haider at 1194-95.
102. See infra Table 1, p. 1079.
103. See id.
104. See 992 F. Supp. at 1197-98.
105. See id. at 1198.
106. See People v. Walker, 282 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ct. App. 1991); 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701 (Ct.
App. 1993); People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 783-85 (Ct. App. 1988); People v. Garza,
38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14 (Ct. App. 1995); Haider v. Dir. of Corr., 992 F. Supp. 1192, 1196 (C.D.
Cal. 1997); PIPES & GAGEN, JR., supra note 5, § 8:3. See generally Zana E. Holley, Annotation,
Police Surveillance Privilege, 67 A.L.R. 5TH 149 (2001).
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Table 1
District/ 2d District, 6th District 6th District 2d District, 1st District, 1st District,
Year Division 2 1995 1993 Division 5 Division 3 Division 4
1995 1991 1998 1988
Charge Cal. Health & Cal. Health & Cal. Health & Cal. Health & Cal. Health & Cal. Health &
Safety Safety Safety Safety Safety Safety
§ 11352 § 11351 §§ 11359, § 11352 §§ 11359, §§ 11351,
11360(a) 11360 11351.5
Distance 100-120 feet 40-50 feet <100 yards 15 feet 25-35 yards 50 yards
Height 2 stories up Ground level, Unknown Ground level Ground level Unknown
on foot to higher
Binoculars Yes: lOX No Yes: 35X No Yes Yes
Radio No Yes Yes Yes Unknown Yes
Time Day 9:20 p.m. Feb. Day 5:45 p.m. Oct. Unknown Day
Weather/ Sunny Amber street Sunny "Good" Unknown Overcast
Lighting lights lighting
Possible Fence Unexplored Fence, shrubs, Unexplored Unobstructed Unobstructed
Obstructions trees, per officer's per officer's
bhildings testimony testimony
Buyer Yes No, sale not Yes, drugs Yes, partial No No
Stopped observed found rock found
Others No Unexplored Yes (disputed) Unexplored Unexplored Unexplored
Similarly
Dressed
Other $2 found on $20 found on Recovered Gang area, Drug area, <1 Co-dealer
Evidence defendant, co-defendant, money defendant ounce juvenile
buyer 4 bindles of consistent arrested 6 marijuana stopped with
dropped rock cocaine found with amount days after recovered, $35, drugs
and pipe on on defendant, sold buyer toilet flushed
ground 12 bindles before
discarded detained
Outcome Disclosure not Disclosure not Disclosure not Disclosure not Conviction Disclosure was
material, material as material, material, reversed, material
conviction remaining conviction conviction procedurally
upheld evidence was upheld upheld insufficient as
sufficient to privilege was
sustain not challenged
conviction until trial
In Camera Yes, mid-trial No, privilege Yes, defense Unknown Yes, mid-trial No
Hearing not allowed
Held challenged questions
Evidence Code section 1041 allows for nondisclosure of an informant
if the public interest in preserving confidentiality outweighs the inter-
est injustice. 10 7 As with surveillance cases, pursuant to Evidence Code
section 1042, the court must make a finding adverse to the prosecu-
tion if disclosure of the confidential witness' identity is material to the
107. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1041 (Deering 1986).
Summer 2002] SURVEILLANCE POST PRIVILEGE 1079
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
defense. s08 Consonant with the surveillance post privilege, the judge
determines the materiality of the informant's identity in an in camera
hearing. 0 9 However, section 1042 establishes two exceptions to the
general rule that the court must make an adverse finding against the
prosecution if the information is material: 1) disclosure is not neces-
sary to prove the legality of a search made pursuant to a warrant and
2) identity is not necessary to establish probable cause to make an
arrest or search. 110 This divergent language for the confidential in-
formant privilege does not apply to the surveillance post privilege and
instead stems from the nature of the use of informants. A tip from an
informant may lead to a search warrant or an arrest without a warrant,
but if there is other direct evidence to support the search warrant or
probable cause for an arrest, disclosure of a confidential informant is
not always necessary. In surveillance cases, a search warrant is not in-
volved and sometimes the only direct evidence is the police officer's
testimony.
Along with sections 1041 and 1042, courts use the balancing test
articulated in Roviaro v. United States' I when considering the material-
ity of an informant's identity. In Roviaro, the United States Supreme
Court recognized a trade-off between encouraging free flow of infor-
mation to law enforcement officials and the right of the defendant to
make a full and fair defense. 12 The Court concluded that where dis-
closure "is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way."' "t 3 The Court declined to articulate a bright line rule and instead
balanced the defendant's right to prepare a defense against the public
interest.11 4 "[W] hether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erro-
neous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, tak-
ing into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the
possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant
factors."' 15 While courts consistently import policy considerations
108. See id.
109. See id. § 1042(d). The in camera hearing was added to the Evidence Code in 1969.
Prior to 1969 materiality was determined in an open hearing and the prosecutor was re-
quired to "disclose or dismiss" if the informant's identity was material. See Anita Susan
Brenner, In Camera Hearings on Informant Disclosure: A Criticism, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 326,
333-34 (1975).
110. See § 1042(b)-(c).
111. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
112. See id. at 62.
113. Id. at 60-61.
114. See id. at 62.
115. Id.
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from the confidential informant privilege to the surveillance post priv-
ilege, they have not relied as heavily on the Roviaro test. 16
The confidential informant privilege and the surveillance post
privilege also deviate in the use of witness testimony. An investigating
officer who is testifying in a proceeding where the surveillance post
privilege has been sustained can maintain secrecy of the surveillance
post but still be questioned on other factors, such as distance, obsta-
cles, and weather.1 17 If the identify of an informant is withheld, how-
ever, the accused cannot cross-examine the witness at all. Disclosure of
an informant's name, by itself, may not be sufficient to test the relia-
bility of the informant without the production of the witness.,, 8 How-
ever, disclosure of a covert location provides everything necessary to
test the reliability of an officer. Due to the nondisclosure of the iden-
tity of an informant, the defendant is in danger of losing either a wit-
ness who might testify to an entrapment defense or potential
testimony that might impeach the officer's statement or both. 119 Simi-
larly, nondisclosure in a surveillance case also precludes the possibility
of witness impeachment or the use of mistaken identity as a defense.
The interest in preserving the future utility of a building has been
recognized as similar to the interest in ensuring the continued viabil-
ity of a confidential informant. In United States v. Green,120 the court
stated that, just as disclosure of a confidential informer's identity de-
stroys the informer's future use, so does the disclosure of a surveil-
lance location destroy the future use of the site.1 21 However, it can be
argued that in a high narcotics area, there may be multiple vantage
points from which drug deals could be viewed. It does not necessarily
follow that this proposition holds true for informants. The future
value of an informant should not be weighted the same as the future
116. See discussion infra Part III.E. In California, only the Walker court has referred to
the Roviaro test. See People v. Walker, 282 Cal. Rptr. 12, 16 (Ct. App. 1991). Similar to
California's restrained use of Roviaro, federal courts have cited Roviaro in only two surveil-
lance cases. See United States v. Harley, 682 F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States
v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
117. See Anderson v. United States, 607 A.2d 490, 495 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming
the trial court decision but criticizing a ruling requiring the defendant to show that there
was no building from which the officer could have observed the transactions, in order to
make a preliminary showing of need).
118. See Carol S. Johnson, Limitations on the Use of Informers-Are the California Safeguards
Adequate?, 3 U.S.F. L. REV. 187, 199 (1968).
119. See id. at 188.
120. 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
121. See id. at 1155.
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value of a surveillance post. However, most California courts do not
agree.
Along with the future utility of an informant or surveillance post,
California courts have recognized the safety of informants and build-
ing owners as a sufficient public policy justification to warrant nondis-
closure. The societal interest in preserving the flow of information to
law enforcement necessitates ensuring the safety of individuals who
facilitate that flow. Remarkably, the Haider court found an even
greater reason to protect a surveillance site than a confidential in-
former because "an informer may be able to hide. '122 The Haider
court mirrored sentiments expressed in the earlier Montgomery opin-
ion that "[a] n informer ... probably has a fairly good chance of hid-
ing because of the anonymity of our predominantly urban
environment. But a person whose address is revealed has no place to
hide."'123 Notwithstanding the ability to conceal the exact address
while revealing it to the defense counsel, is it reasonable to expect an
informer to move about, on the run, for an indefinite period? An in-
formant has allegedly witnessed illegal activity and snitched on an ac-
cused, while building owners are one step removed from law
enforcement activity. Unlike informants, building owners are only tan-
gentially associated with the surveillance activity and are not witnesses
against the accused. The protection afforded to buildings vis-A-vis in-
formants is disproportional to the associated risk and potential ill-will
directed toward a building owner.
In spite of this, procedures in applying the surveillance privilege
and the confidential informant privilege have been almost identical,
as evidenced by courts' reliance on confidential informant analogies.
While both privileges share similar policy concerns, the significant dis-
tinctions addressed in this section compel adoption of separate proce-
dural considerations.
III. Procedural Application of the Privilege
The official information privilege is triggered by a defendant's
request for discovery of the surveillance post. The court then begins a
burden-shifting process in which the prosecution must invoke the
privilege.' 2 4 If the privilege is sustained, the burden then shifts to the
defense to demonstrate that the surveillance post is material to the
122. People v. Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369, 371 (Ct. App. 1995).
123. People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 784 (Ct. App. 1988).
124. Other state and federal courts do not assign burdens of proof, but instead look at
the totality of the evidence. See United States v. Foster, 986 F.2d 541, 543-44 (D.C. Cir.
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defendant's guilt or innocence. 125 The judge (or magistrate) per-
forms a balancing test to determine if the need for disclosure is out-
weighed by the need to preserve the confidentiality of the location. 126
The judge will sustain the privilege if she determines that "the public
interest in nondisclosure outweighs the interest of justice served by
disclosure."1 27 If the court requires knowledge of the exact address of
the surveillance post in order to rule, the judge may require disclo-
sure in an ex parte in camera hearing. 28 Even if the court finds that a
privilege exists, Evidence Code section 1042 provides that "the court
must nonetheless make a finding adverse to the prosecution if the
location is material to the defense."'129 In addition to the in camera
hearing, the court also conducts an adversary hearing at which all par-
ties may present evidence on the issue of the claim of privilege. 130 To
illustrate how the privilege works in the courtroom, excerpts of the
preliminary hearing transcript from People v. Alfaro 3t are presented in
this section.
A. Invoking the Official Information Privilege
The official information privilege can be invoked in any eviden-
tiary court proceeding when the defense specifically requests the testi-
fying officer to reveal the location of the surveillance post.1 32 The
privilege can be invoked or challenged at trial or at a variety of pre-
trial proceedings such as a section 995 hearing to dismiss charges, 133 a
preliminary hearing, 134 ajurisdictional hearing, 35 a suppression hear-
1993); Hollins v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 397, 399 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Commonwealth
v. Lugo, 548 N.E.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
125. See Hines v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30 (Ct. App. 1988); People v. Mont-
gomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 784 (Ct. App. 1988).
126. See id.
127. 1 JEFFERSON'S CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK, CEB § 42.11 (3d ed. 2001).
128. See id. § 35.30.
129. People v. Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369, 371 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
130. See id.
131. No. 180975 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000), appeal denied sub nom. Alfaro v. Superior
Court, No. A094599 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2001) (denying writ of prohibition for failure
to provide a record sufficient to enable informed appellate review).
132. See Interview with Rebecca Marcus, Deputy Public Defender, San Francisco Office
of the Public Defender, in San Francisco, Cal. (Dec. 18, 2001).
133. See Hines v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. Rptr. 28, 29 (Ct. App. 1988). Penal Code
section 995 allows an information to be set aside after a defendant has been arraigned if
the defendant was committed without reasonable or probable cause. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 995 (Deering 2001).
134. See Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr. 28. See also People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781
(1988).
135. See In re Sergio M., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701, 702 (Ct. App. 1993).
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ing, 136 or an in limine motion.137 To initiate a ruling against disclosure,
the prosecution must explain why it cannot disclose the location or
declare that an explanation would betray the privilege. 138 A bona fide
justification for nondisclosure is not required as the government has
the option to assert that disclosure would betray the privilege. During
cross-examination of the testifying officer at the preliminary hearing
in Alfaro, the invocation of the privilege occurred in the following
manner:
Q. . . . where were you located at during your period of surveil-
lance at 1:04 on this date?
MS. LOPEZ: Objection, Your Honor. It is privileged.
THE COURT: Are you claiming a privilege, sir?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MS. MARCUS: At this time, Your Honor, I would like to say several
things for the record. First of all, if the officer is invoking the privi-
lege, first of all, obviously I would like an in camera hearing. I have
a few questions. I would like an in camera hearing only to the issue
of whether he can claim privilege. Once Your Honor makes that
determination, I have several more questions as to the materiality
of this location. 139
As illustrated by this exchange, the form of the request can be
quite general. After the officer or district attorney invokes the privi-
lege, the defense may demand an in camera hearing to determine if
the privilege applies. If the defense does not request an in camera
hearing, it may be waived, as the in camera provisions of Evidence
Code section 915 are "permissive, not mandatory."140 To be granted a
hearing, the defense should also offer proof of the need for
disclosure.
136. See United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Hicks v. United States, 431 A.2d 18, 19 (D.C.
1981).
137. See Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 781. An in limine motion may be a motion to
suppress evidence, pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 which allows the suppression of
evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable and illegal warrantless search and/or
seizure in violation of the defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (Deering 2001).
138. See Anderson v. United States, 607 A.2d 490, 496 (D.C. 1992). See also Torres v.
Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 690 (Ct. App. 2000) (ruling against disclosure of a
confidential informant requires the prosecution to show why the matter is privileged, or
declare that the explanation would compromise the privilege).
139. Rep. Tr. at 37:9-20, People v. Alfaro, No. 18097S (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000).
The People were represented by Merri Lopez from the San Francisco District Attorney's
Office and Alfaro was represented by Rebecca Marcus from the San Francisco Public De-
fender's Office. See id. at 1:1.
140. PIPES & GAGEN, JR., supra note 5, § 8:7.
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B. Defendant's Initial Showing of Need
Before granting an in camera hearing, some courts may require
the defendant to make a prima facie showing that the surveillance
location is material to the defense. 141 The Montgomery court referred
to this pre-requisite, but did not identify the standard which should be
applied. 142 It relied on People v. IngraM143 for the requirement of a
prima facie showing of materiality. 144 Ingram, however, involved the
disclosure of a confidential informant.1 45 While the two privileges are
similar, the Ingram court required the defense to show that the iden-
tity of the informant would be material at trial by demonstrating that
there was a reasonable possibility that the informant could provide
evidence that would exonerate the defendant. 146 It can be argued that
a comparable test for the surveillance privilege would be to require
the defense to show the possibility that an obstacle existed which
could have obstructed the officer's view. However, there is no pub-
lished opinion requiring such a test at this stage.
In reality, the initial showing of need may be less structured than
the Montgomery test and may not occur precisely between the invoca-
tion of the privilege and the in camera hearing. In the Alfaro prelimi-
nary hearing, the defense demonstrated this requirement:
MS. MARCUS: Your Honor, at this time I am prepared to go
through a litany of obstructions as to the officer's view, which I
think is highly relevant as to surveillance cases.
THE COURT: Miss Marcus, unless you have an offer of proof as to
something specific at that time and place, it is speculation.
MS. MARCUS: I respectfully disagree. I just would like my position
clear for the record here. We have a surveillance case. 14 7
Once the defendant has made an initial showing of need, the
judge or magistrate must balance the public interest in nondisclosure
against the defendant's constitutional rights in determining whether
to sustain the privilege.
141. See Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 785. See also Anderson v. United States, 607 A.2d
490, 496 (D.C. 1992).
142. See Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
143. 151 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Ct. App. 1978).
144. See Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
145. See Ingram, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
146. See id. at 245.
147. Rep. Tr. at 36:27-28, 37:1-7, People v. Alfaro, No. 180975 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 8,
2000).
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C. Balancing of Public Interests Against the Defendant's Rights
1. Public Interest Weighing Against Disclosure
A disquieting aspect of the public policy rationale asserted by the
government is the utter absence of any particularized finding of need
on the part of law enforcement. Although some judges, during an in
camera hearing, require particularized reasons for sustaining the privi-
lege, 148 the government is not required to specify to whom, by what
means, or on what basis there is a credible threat to safety. The gov-
ernment merely asserts broad public policy concerns, citing prior
cases that have relied on those justifications, and the burden shifts to
the defense, who then must overcome an unrealistic burden of proof.
Despite the qualified right to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses, the court must weigh such countervailing concerns as: the
safety of the arresting officers, the safety of property owners or manag-
ers who allow their premises to be used for surveillance, the likelihood
that criminals would be able to avoid surveillance if the location were
known, the potential for future surveillance activities being frustrated,
and the possibility that the information would educate third parties as
to how to conduct illegal surveillance. 149
Safety of police officers and building owners is a ubiquitous but
established justification for the official information privilege. Courts
often cite Green, Hines, Sergio, and Montgomery when identifying public
interests. The often-quoted safety concern from Green is that "[t]he
revelation of a surveillance location might also threaten the safety of
police officers using the observation post, or lead to adversity for co-
operative owners or occupants of the building."'150
Although possible, potential harm to individuals due to the dis-
closure of a property address is often speculative. In In re. Darryl G., 15
the testifying officer conceded that he was unaware of any previous
retaliation in response to disclosure: "[T]he Captain testified that the
precinct has lost surveillance posts in the past, sometimes by way of
disclosure, and to his knowledge, there has never been any violent
retaliation against police officers or civilians in the neighborhood
where the post was located." 152 Similarly, in Montgomery the investigat-
148. See Interview with Judge Wallace P. Douglass, San Francisco County Superior
Court, Criminal Division, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 22, 2002).
149. See Holley, supra note 106, § 2 at 156. (2001).
150. United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981).





ing officer "conceded that he knew of no instances where a surveil-
lance location had been disclosed, and therefore he did not know
[an] incident in which a person had been killed as a result."153 A po-
tential reason for the absence of data on retaliation may be that the
privilege is seldom overcome. Retaliation is only possible if the loca-
tion is revealed-as the location is seldom disclosed, retaliation as a
general justification becomes more speculative. Safety of police of-
ficers and private citizens is a legitimate concern but, in most cases,
can be protected even if the covert surveillance location is disclosed. If
defense counsel is admitted to the in camera hearing and required to
maintain secrecy, access to the information would afford the defen-
dant an opportunity to ascertain if any obstacles existed and whether
the officer's testimony is credible, without jeopardizing anyone's
safety.
If the surveillance site nevertheless became known, it is improba-
ble that criminals, armed with such knowledge, could avoid surveil-
lance on account of the disclosure. By virtue of public arrests in a
particular area, criminals are already apprised of surveillance activities
whether or not a specific site is identified. Moreover, when surveil-
lance is performed in even moderately populated areas, there are
often multiple sites which could be utilized.
Another accepted justification for nondisclosure is the endanger-
ment of future police investigations. The Hines opinion is often cited
for this proposition as it sustained the privilege because "the location
was 'currently used as an ongoing operation for investigations' and
thus ongoing investigations would be jeopardized by disclosure."1 54
Sergio echoed this sentiment when it determined that disclosure
"would decrease the effectiveness of law enforcement in the fu-
ture."1 55 The Montgomery court also acknowledged the aforemen-
tioned policy concerns such as the safety of police officers and
building owners, as well as the future value of cooperative building
owners that disclosure would "likely destroy the future vakle of that
location for police surveillance." 156 Prosecutors have agreed that
"[w] ithout this privilege, a lot of investigations would have to be cur-
tailed and prosecutions would have to be terminated."' 57 In an urban
153. People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 782 (Ct. App. 1988).
154. Hines v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. Rptr. 28, 29 (Ct. App. 1988).
155. In re Sergio M., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701, 703 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting the minor
defendant's investigator).
156. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
157. Richard Pliskin, In Surveillance Cases, Location Is Everything, N.J.L.J. (Jan. 25, 1993),
at 3.
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environment, where drug trafficking is a pervasive problem, there are
often many buildings that police could utilize. Although it may take
time to develop relationships with building owners, the inconvenience
of moving a surveillance site to a new location should not warrant
such an intrusion on a defendant's constitutional rights.
Although no California case has articulated this justification, the
possibility that disclosing a surveillance post would educate third par-
ties on how to conduct illegal surveillance is de minimus, if not alto-
gether nonexistent. It is dubious whether drug dealers would desire
knowledge regarding the mechanics of setting up a surveillance oper-
ation. Even if they did, however, knowledge of a surveillance location
itself reveals no procedural or technical aspects of a police surveil-
lance operation. At most, the location information could only hint at
police strategy. However, even if the location were strategic, its discov-
ery would not convey the overall plan or reasoning behind the site
selection.
2. Defendant's Constitutional Right to Cross-Examination
There is no bright line rule granting a defendant the constitu-
tional right to disclosure in all circumstances. "When confronted with
an allegation that a criminal defendant has the right to disclosure of
every informant in every case, the United States Supreme Court found
no support for the position in the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment or in the Sixth Amendment right of confronta-
tion."158 Despite the constitutional floor of the Sixth Amendment, the
trial court has broad discretion to control the scope of cross-examina-
tion. 159 "A basic function of cross-examination is to explore credibil-
ity."' 160 In surveillance cases, however, credibility cannot always be
explored without disclosure of the location. The officer's credibility is
presumed up-front and the conclusion that the location is immaterial
is bootstrapped by concluding that the view could not have been ob-
structed, otherwise the officer could not have observed what he said
he saw.
When a defendant is unable to cross-examine a witness regarding
certain aspects of the alleged crime, the question becomes whether a
trial or pre-trial proceeding is inherently flawed and, therefore, un-
fair. Although the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine and con-
158. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 783 (citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312-13
(1967); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 n.2 (1967)).




front witnesses is not an absolute right,1 61 in the case of hand-to-hand
narcotics transactions often the only evidence against a defendant is
the officer's testimony. Because of this, the defendant is denied any
opportunity to fully explore the only evidence inculpating him-the
officer's credibility. Without disclosure of the surveillance location
and in the absence of other inculpatory evidence such as large sums of
money or drugs, the defendant's only available defense is a denial of
the charges. 162 If the defense counsel cannot question the arresting
officer about possible obstacles and whether the officer actually saw
what he said he saw, then the jury has no recourse but to weigh the
officer's credibility against the defendant's. The nondisclosure of the
surveillance site impedes the jury's ability to fairly assess the police
officer's credibility. 16 3
While courts have been imprecise about the origin of a defen-
dant's rights, it has been commonly accepted that there is a general
right of cross-examination which applies in pre-trial proceedings and
affects the substantial rights of the accused. 164 "Thus, whether [the
courts] describe the right of cross-examination as deriving from the
fundamental concepts embedded in the Due Process Clause or as im-
plicit in the rules governing federal criminal proceedings . . . [there
is] no doubt of the applicability of the right . . . or of its impor-
tance." 165 The Hines court found that the magistrate had "severely lim-
ited the petitioner's right to cross-examine on [a] material issue" and
reversed the lower court ruling.166 "The right of cross-examination is
more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the con-
stitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the accuracy of the
truth-determining process. 1 6 7 Therefore, the right should not be en-
croached upon by generalized justifications and bootstrapped find-
ings of immateriality.
3. Defendant's Constitutional Right to Due Process
Due process may not absolutely require disclosure in order to test
an officer's reliability. However, "[a] n improper denial of the right of
161. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
162. See State v. Zenquis, 618 A.2d 335, 337 (N.J. 1993).
163. See id.
164. See United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ruling on a
federal suppression hearing attempting to disclose location).
165. Id. (citations omitted).
166. Hines v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1988).
167. Id. (paraphrasing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
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cross-examination constitutes a denial of due processes."1 6 In Mont-
gomery, the court applied sections 1040 and 1042 to a defendant's
right to due process when it concluded that "[t]he statute speaks in
terms of 'necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice' . . .which
appears to be a due process concept." 169 The court also acknowledged
that section 1042 "codifies the due process demand ... that the prose-
cution cannot commence criminal proceedings 'and then invoke its
governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which
might be material to his [or her] defense." 70 Essentially, the govern-
ment is charging a defendant with illegal activity and then refusing to
allow the defendant to test the accuracy of its accusation. While this
denial of cross-examination may be a denial of due process, due pro-
cess is also denied in surveillance cases by virtue of the secrecy and
procedural inconsistencies associated with in camera hearings.
17 1
D. In Camera Hearing
"American distrust for secret proceedings was roused by persecu-
tions of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber. . . . 'The knowledge
that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the
forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of
judicial power.'"172 However, this public forum is absent in an in cam-
era hearing.
If the defendant succeeds in the prima facie showing of need, the
judge or magistrate has the discretion to grant an in camera hearing,
attended by the party claiming the privilege (the officer and/or dis-
trict attorney). 173 In California, Evidence Code section 915 prescribes
that a judge may conduct an in camera hearing to determine the mate-
riality of the information. 174 During the hearing, the judge balances
the public interest against the interests of the defendant and con-
cludes "with the trial court making findings sufficient to enable the
appellate court to review its decision."' 7 5 A record is made of the hear-
168. Priestly v. Superior Court, 330 P.2d 39, 45 (1958).
169. People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 783 (Ct. App. 1988) (citations
omitted).
170. Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953)).
171. See discussion infra Part III.D.
172. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (granting a mo-
tion to suppress evidence) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-72 (1948)).
173. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1042(d) (Deering 2001).
174. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 915 (Deering 2001).
175. People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (citing Parnes v. Superior Court, 146
Cal. Rptr. 818, 821 (Ct. App. 1978)).
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ing but is not transcribed until requested by the defendant to assist
review if the ruling is challenged.' 76 When so requested, the tran-
scribed record is sealed to preserve the secrecy of the location and
only the reviewing judge is allowed to read it. Although it is not an ex
parte proceeding per se, the person invoking the privilege, here the
prosecution, can determine whether to exclude opposing counsel. 17
7
As the party invoking the privilege is the prosecution, it is a construc-
tive ex parte proceeding. While the authority is clear regarding when
and under what circumstances an in camera hearing may be held,
there is broad discretion with respect to how the hearing is
conducted.
Even in the federal arena, procedural variances exist in the way
district courts direct in camera hearings. In Hicks v. United States,178 the
district court judge upheld the privilege and denied questioning as to
the exact surveillance location. 179 Within the same federal circuit and
in the same year, the district court in United States v. Jenkins s0 ordered
disclosure to defense counsel subject to the condition that the surveil-
lance location would not be disclosed to the defendant, and gave
leave to reopen the evidentiary hearing if the defense thought the
officers' view was obstructed. 181 By contrast, in California, no pub-
lished case has allowed this conditional disclosure to the defense
counsel.18 2
An in camera hearing is discretionary and is waived if not re-
quested.'8 3 In both Hicks and Jenkins, the defense did not request an
in camera hearing and the judge was not required sua sponte to order a
hearing absent a request on the record.'8 4 This is true in California as
well. An in camera hearing was held in Haider, Sergio, and Montgomery,
but not in Garza, Hines or Walker.'85
176. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 915, 1042(d). The standard of review for appellate courts is
the abuse of discretion standard. See People v. Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369, 374 (Ct. App.
1995).
177. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1042(d).
178. 431 A.2d 18 (D.C. 1981).
179. See id.
180. 530 F. Supp. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
181. See id. at 9.
182. See generally, People v. Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369 (Ct. App. 1995); In re Sergio
M., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701 (Ct. App. 1993); People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Ct.
App. 1988); People v. Garza, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11 (Ct. App. 1995); Hines v. Superior Court,
251 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Ct. App. 1988); People v. Walker, 282 Cal. Rptr. 12 (Ct. App. 1991).
183. See Holley, supra note 106, at § I(2) (b).
184. See Hicks, 431 A.2d at 22; Jenkins, 530 F. Supp. at 10.
185. See generally, Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369; Sergio, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701; Montgomey,
252 Cal. Rptr. 779; Garza, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11; Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr. 28; Walker, 282 Cal.
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During the in camera hearing the magistrate or judge attempts to
explore the accuracy of the officer's observations.' 8 6 An officer can
support the existence of a threat drawing on his experience and
knowledge of the people involved, as well as intelligence informa-
tion.187 Because the location has not been disclosed, a specific threat
is not always available, so an officer may testify to the defendant's pro-
pensity for violence or past retaliations in other circumstances. 188
Building owners can also testify in the in camera hearing based on
their personal knowledge of the individuals involved. 189
The judge begins the process by asking broad questions, such as
why the prosecution is asserting privilege for that location, and usually
receives only generalized answers in response-such as building
owner safety and the future value of the site. 190 The judge then follows
up with specific questions, such as whether anyone in particular has
been threatened or if there are other locations in the neighborhood
that could be used.' 9 ' At the court's discretion, the defendant may
propose questions to be asked at the hearing.19 2 If the prosecution
responds with only generalized answers, the judge determines
whether the government's "concerns are legitimate enough to en-
croach on the confrontation privilege" by considering the totality of
the circumstances.' 93
Perhaps the most obvious danger of the in camera hearing is that
the officer may give plausible, even compelling testimony during the
in camera hearing that "could conceivably be true, but unless [the
judge] goes to the site, you don't know. The irony is when the defen-
dant is seeking the means to test whether the officer saw what he said
he saw and you have to rely on the officer." 194 Only disclosure of the
surveillance site can remedy the risk of untruthful officers.
An ex parte hearing not only burdens the defense, but also the
judge or magistrate who must be an advocate for the defendant as well
as an impartial fact finder. "The ex parte process places too much
Rptr. 12 (clarifying procedures for an in camera hearing but not specifying whether one
had been used in the proceeding below).
186. See Douglass, supra note 148.
187. See Interview with Judith T. Brown, Deputy District Attorney, Marin County Dis-
trict Attorney's Office, San Rafael, Cal. (July 11, 2002).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See Douglass, supra note 148.
191. See id.
192. See People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785 (Ct. App. 1988).




confidence in judicial prescience and invites error, even unfair-
ness." 195 "In our adversary system, it is enough for judges to judge.
The determination of what may be useful to the defense can properly
and effectively be made only by an advocate."1 96 One risk associated
with an ex parte hearing is that the defendant cannot be assured a
judge will pose the kinds of questions the defense feels might impeach
the officer. Even if the defense is allowed to pose questions for the
hearing, without being involved, the defense cannot follow up on the
information presented.
A bilateral hearing is superior to an ex parte hearing, because it
introduces advocacy for the defendant, but even the presence of de-
fense counsel does not guarantee complete protection of the defen-
dant's rights. 197 One risk of allowing the defense to participate in the
in camera hearing on the condition that the information not be re-
vealed to the client is that it puts the defense attorney in an awkward
position as she may learn things that would be worthwhile to discuss
with her client but which she cannot reveal. 198 An apparently inno-
cent remark or reference may have special significance to a defen-
dant, but may be devoid of meaning to one not acquainted with the
relevant circumstances.1 99 Therefore, although a bilateral hearing is
not a panacea, it is needed to avoid burdening the trial judge with the
additional duty of being an adversary or advocate. 200
E. Defendant's Showing of Materiality
The location of the secret surveillance post may not be material if
the defendant confessed or if he was charged with simple possession
and drugs were recovered from his person.201 However, absent other
evidence, if the People succeed in camera, "the adversary process
should be utilized, probing the information's relevance to the de-
fense, exploring with counsel the availability of other alternatives,
and, if necessary, hearing testimony voir dire."202 If a court sustains the
government's privilege, the information is not disclosed to the defen-
195. People v. Superior Court (Biggs), 97 Cal. Rptr. 118, 124 (Ct. App. 1971).
196. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966).
197. See Brenner, supra note 109 at 336.
198. See Douglass, supra note 148.
199. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969).
200. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966).
201. See Thomas J. Orloff & Mark Hutchins, California Criminal Investigation 298
(2001 ed.).
202. People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting People v.
Superior Court (Biggs), 97 Cal. Rptr. 118, 124 (Ct. App. 1971)).
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dant, but the defense counsel may still question the officer's ability to
have in fact made the observations, as long as the questions do not
reveal the exact location of the post.203 Typical questions involve
weather conditions, distance, height, other bystanders dressed like the
defendant, lighting, presence of obstructions, and whether binoculars
were used. 204 For example, in Hines, the defense was able to ascertain
that the officer was fifty yards away and the day was somewhat over-
cast.29 15 In Sergio the defense determined that the officer observed the
transaction using binoculars at a distance of one hundred yards, on a
clear and sunny day.9° 6 While these details provide some basic notion
of locality, they do not give the defense counsel enough information
to properly explore the veracity of the testifying officer.
While the defendant is required to make a prima facie showing
that the privileged information is material to the defense, there is a
three-way split among California appellate courts regarding the appro-
priate standard to use. The Hines-Montgomery standard requires that
disclosure is material to guilt or innocence. 20 7 The Walker test requires
the defense to show a reasonable possibility that disclosure would be
material to guilt or innocence, which would result in the defendant's
exoneration.208 Finally, the Haider-Garza-Sergio standard requires the
defense to show that the officer was making his observations from an
obstructed location and that there is a reasonable possibility that dis-
closure would be material to guilt or innocence, which might result in
the defendant's exoneration. 21°9
Under Hines and Montgomery, both decided in 1988, the First Ap-
pellate District required the defense to show that disclosure is material
to guilt or innocence.21" Under this standard, the claim of privilege
pertains to the material issue of whether the officer actually had a
"clear and unobstructed view."21' The defense must offer proof that
there were obstructed locations around the arrest site. It cannot be
203. See id. at 782.
204. See Orloff, supra note 201.
205. See Hines v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. Rptr. 28, 29 (Ct. App. 1988).
206. See In re Sergio M., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701, 704 (Ct. App. 1993).
207. See Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
208. See People v. Walker, 282 Cal. Rptr. 12, 17 (Ct. App. 1991).
209. See People v. Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369, 371 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Garza, 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 1995); In re Sergio M., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701, 704 (Ct. App.
1993).
210. See Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 31; People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 784 (Ct.
App. 1988).
211. Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
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merely a fishing expedition. 212 The Hines and Montgomery courts
found that the surveillance site was material in order to permit the
defense to test whether the officer could see what he claimed to have
seen from the point where he claimed to have been. 213 In addressing
whether to sustain the privilege in Montgomery, the trial court held that
the official information privilege is "given and upheld as a matter of
law regardless of materiality when the location is being presently used for
current observation by police agency. '214 While the reviewing court
reversed the lower court ruling for procedural reasons, the rationale
for sustaining the privilege was not found unreasonable even though
there was no direct evidence other than the officer's testimony.21 5
In Walker, the Second Appellate District, in 1991, considered us-
ing the Hines-Montgomery standard, but chose instead to adopt a stan-
dard from Price v. Superior Court, 2 1 6 a case involving disclosure of a
confidential informant's identity.2 17 Under the Price standard, the de-
fense must show that there is a "reasonable possibility" that disclosure
of the surveillance site "could constitute material evidence on the is-
sue of guilt which would result in his exoneration.'" 218 This standard is
similar to the more stringent test used by the Sixth Appellate District
and may have been the precursor to the standard used in Haider,
which was decided in 1995.
Most courts follow the test for materiality articulated in the
Haider, Garza, and Sergio line of cases, originating from the Second
and Sixth Appellate Districts. 219 This standard requires the defense to
show that there were locations in the area from which the view was
impaired, and that there is reason to believe the officer was making his
observations from such a location.220 The second prong of this stan-
dard is nearly impossible to meet.221
The Garza court also incorporated the Walker standard, but
changed "would" to "might," thereby requiring that disclosure might
212. See Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
213. See Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 31; Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
214. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (emphasis added).
215. See id. at 785.
216. 463 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1970).
217. See id.
218. People v. Walker, 282 Cal. Rptr. 12, 17 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added).
219. See generally People v. Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369 (Ct, App. 1995); People v.
Garza, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11 (Ct. App. 1995); In re Sergio M., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701 (Ct. App.
1993).
220. See generally Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369.
221. See People v. Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369, 373 (1995); People v. Garza, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 11, 14 (1995); In re Sergio M., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701, 704 (1993).
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result in a reasonable possibility of exoneration. 222 The Garza court
found this modified approach to signify the "crucial standard."223
Courts following this standard view the existence of obstructed loca-
tions as "logically irrelevant" absent evidence that the officer observed
the transaction from an obstructed view.2 24 It could be argued that the
absence of a reason to believe an officer was observing the transaction
from an obstructed position does not make the matter irrelevant, but
merely goes to the weight that it should be accorded in balancing the
government's interests against the defendant's interests. As illustrated
by Sergio, this standard introduces a hurdle that is almost insurmounta-
ble. There, despite the existence of at least two locations with obstruc-
tions and a factual dispute regarding whether the defendant was
dressed like other people in the area, the location of the surveillance
post was found not material. 225 The Sergio court determined that
knowing the location was "absolutely essential" yet refused to make an
adverse finding.2 26 Does this mean if the trial court finds materiality, it
can nevertheless ignore the mandate of section 1042?
The disparity in standards exercised in California can be viewed
either as an evolution of reasoning, a bona fide split of opinion, or
perhaps simply a difference with no distinction, as the standard for
disclosure is so difficult that it is almost never met. The discrepancy
between Walker and Haider, which were both decided in the Second
Appellate District, is explained by the fact that Division Five of the
Second Appellate District decided Walker in 1991 and Division Two
decided Haider in 1995.227 While Walker has not been overruled, the
Second Appellate District may have used Haider to extend the Walker
standard. The Haider court recognized Division Five's holding in
Walker and criticized the Sixth Appellate District for its interpretation
of Walker.228 Notwithstanding its support of Walker, Division Two
adopted the more stringent Garza and Sergio standard, requiring a rea-
222. See Garza, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
223. Id. (quoting People v. Alderrou, 236 Cal. Rptr. 740, 744 (1986)).
224. Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373 (quoting Anderson v. United States, 607 A.2d 490,
497 (D.C. 1992)).
225. See Sergio, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
226. See id. at 703.
227. See People v. Walker, 282 Cal. Rptr. 12 (Ct. App. 1991); Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
369.
228. See Haider, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373 (interpreting Garza to have read Walker as hold-
ing that a reasonable possibility of exoneration can be shown by evidence that suggests at
least one point within the surveillance area was obstructed).
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sonable possibility that the officer was actually in an obstructed
location. 229
The California Supreme Court has provided no guidance to help
resolve these apparent discrepancies, although Justice Mosk was of the
opinion that the Haider petition for review should have been
granted.230 Neither has the United States Supreme Court articulated a
materiality standard for the disclosure of surveillance sites. However,
in Roviaro v. United States, the Court addressed materiality in the
closely analogous issue of the disclosure of confidential informants. 231
While only one California court232 has explicitly cited Roviaro, federal
courts often rely on Roviaro to analogize to surveillance cases.233 In
Haider v. Director of Corrections,234 a federal district court found that
section 1040(b) (2) is "conceptually similar, if not identical" to the
Roviaro balancing test used for the informant and surveillance privi-
leges under the Federal Rule of Evidence 501.235 While federal courts
have not disregarded the Roviaro standard, they have interpreted it to
include the more restrictive test discussed under the Haider, Garza,
and Sergio cases: The defendant must demonstrate both that there are
locations from which the view is impaired and "some reason to believe
that the officer made his observations from such a location."236
The division of burdens, where the government merely asserts
the privilege on generalized justifications and where the defense must
show that the officer saw the alleged transaction from an obstructed
view, is inherently flawed. While the defense can question the observ-
ing officer regarding whether he saw the alleged transaction from one
of the possible obstructed vantage points, the officer can quash the
defendant's initial showing by testifying unambiguously that he was in
an unimpaired location. 237 If the defense cannot show that there was
some reason to believe the officer saw the transaction from an ob-
structed location, a court will sustain the defense's initial showing of
229. See id.
230. See Haider v. Dir. of Corr., 992 F. Supp. 1192, 1195 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
231. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (requiring the public interest to
be balanced against the defendant's right to prepare a defense).
232. See People v. Walker, 282 Cal. Rptr. 12, 16 n.6 (Ct. App. 1991).
233. See Haider, 992 F. Supp. at 1196-97; Hicks v. United States, 431 A.2d 18, 21-22
(D.C. Cir. 1981); People v. Superior Court (Biggs), 97 Cal. Rptr. 118, 124 (Ct. App. 1971);
Anderson v. United States, 607 A.2d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Harley, 682
F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
234. 992 F. Supp. 1192 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
235. Id. at 1197.
236. Anderson, 607 A.2d at 497.
237. See Haider, 992 F. Supp. at 1197.
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need only if the observing officer's testimony is unreliable. 238 This is
an incredibly high bar in that it is a Herculean task to show the unreli-
ability of the officer's testimony when the defense cannot test the ve-
racity of the testimony with cross-examination.
This division also creates a circular argument, as the defendant
needs the disclosure to adequately justify the need for the disclo-
sure-he must demonstrate his need to obtain the location, the value
of which is unknown, and establish that this need outweighs any harm
to the government from disclosure. On an analogous matter pertain-
ing to the official information privilege, the California Supreme Court
acknowledged that "[o] rdinarily a defendant cannot show that a state-
ment contains contradictory matters until he has seen it, and, if such a
showing were a condition precedent to production, his rights would
be dependent upon the highly fortuitous circumstance of his detailed
knowledge as to the contents of the statement." 23 9 Therefore, these
standards of materiality are too heavy for most defendants to bear.
F. Alternatives to Disclosure
In order to overcome the official information privilege, some fed-
eral district courts have required the defendant to show that the evi-
dence is needed to conduct the defense and that there are no
adequate alternative means of getting at the same point.2 40 Some Cali-
fornia trial courts have also employed alternative means of disclosure.
When the surveillance post privilege is sustained, alternatives to disclo-
sure should always be suggested by the defense as was done in Alfaro:
MS. MARCUS: I would also propose, Your Honor, because you
have upheld the privilege, that the location be revealed to me, that
I can reveal it to my investigator, not to my client, so it can be
viewed, photographed or videotaped so some evidence can be
brought into court, so that the vantage point can be seen from the
location to where Mr. Alfaro was standing.
THE COURT: Denied. 24 1
MS. MARCUS: I will be happy to have the location revealed to a
defense investigator for me to come there and present evidence to
238. See Hicks v. United States, 431 A.2d 18, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
239. People v. Chapman, 338 P.2d 428, 430 (Cal. 1959).
240. See United States v. Harley, 682 F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1982).




the Court on whether this can really be seen from where the officer
says it can be seen.242
In addition to the alternatives discussed in Alfaro, the defense can
also request that a videotape or photograph, taken from the surveil-
lance site, be provided to the judge for his in camera review. 243 The
defense can also request that the judge visit the surveillance site in
person, under similar conditions. One judge in San Francisco, Judge
Douglass, traveled to a surveillance site to test the veracity of an of-
ficer's testimony and viewed videotape taken by the defense of a sur-
veillance location.24 4 Despite the appeal of acquiring first-hand
knowledge of the site, the judge risks becoming a witness when testing
the reliability of an officer's testimony via a site visit.245 While the site
visit was useful to Judge Douglass, the defense counsel began asking
him questions about the location which put him in a precarious posi-
tion.246 The canons in the Code of Judicial Ethics prohibit judges
from voluntarily appearing as witnesses and suggest that judges should
discourage people from requiring them to serve as witnesses. 247 The
Code of Judicial Conduct also prohibits judges from independently
investigating the facts in a case and allows judges to consider only the
evidence presented. 248 For these reasons the judge must receive the
consent of both parties before employing alternative means of disclo-
sure.249 Alternatives to disclosure are a modest attempt to equalize a
situation that is heavily weighted toward the prosecution. However,
because of the judge's risk of misconduct and the bilateral consent
requirement, alternatives are not always available or feasible.
G. Findings Adverse to the Prosecution
If a court sustains the surveillance privilege and the defense
meets the materiality standard, the court must make a finding adverse
242. Id. at 9:6-10 (Dec. 15, 2000).
243. Prosecutors contend that photographs may reveal the location based on the angle
and perspective of the shot. Interview with Judith T. Brown, Deputy District Attorney, Ma-
fin County District Attorney's Office, San Rafael, Cal. (uly 11, 2002).
244. See Douglass, supra note 148. Note that if the location is not disclosed, ajudge can
refuse to answer any questions under the color of privilege.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See CAL. CODE OFJUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 2(B)(2) (2001) ("Ajudge must not tes-
tify as a character witness without being subpoenaed because to do so may lend the pres-
tige of the judicial office in support of the party for whom the judge testifies.").
248. See id., Canon 3(B)(7) (2001) (embracing independent investigation of facts
within general prohibition against ex parte communications).
249. See Douglass, supra note 148.
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to the prosecution pursuant to California Evidence Code section
1042.250 Section 1042 does not mandate what the result of an adverse
finding is,251 but the result may include striking the officer's testimony
or dismissing the charges. 252 The usual sanction is the suppression of
the officer's testimony regarding any observations made from the sur-
veillance location. 253 In a rare ruling for the defendant, the Hines
court reversed a lower court ruling and found section 1042 applicable
because the defendant needed the information to test the observing
officer's knowledge. 254 In justifying the holding, the court explained
that " [t] he purpose of the defense in learning the location was to test
that very observation-did [the officer] actually have a clear and un-
obstructed view of the scene? This was the very issue to which the priv-
ileged information was material." 255
If the prosecution refuses to disclose the location after an adverse
finding, the court can sanction the prosecution with contempt or dis-
miss the charges.2 56 The contempt sanction, however, does not pro-
vide the defendant any relief unless the prosecution is moved to
disclose the location. 257 If the charge is for drug sales, the court could
also reduce the charge to possession. 258
In such rare cases where a court does not sustain the privilege,
the prosecution has the choice of not presenting the evidence (the
officer's testimony) or disclosing the surveillance site. When, as in
Hines, there is no other direct evidence besides the officer's observa-
tions, the only alternative is dismissal. 259
250. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1042 (Deering 2001).
251. See PIPES & GAGEN, JR., supra note 5, at § 8:7.
252. See Hines v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing People v.
McShann, 330 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1958); Priestly v. Superior Court, 330 P.2d 39, 43 (Cal.
1958)).
253. See Orloff, supra note 201, at 297.
254. Hines, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
255. Id.
256. Pipes & Gagen, Jr., supra note 5, at 433.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. The prosecution may have an agreement with the building owner to not disclose
the identity of the location, so there may be a moral obligation beyond the constitutional
restraints that would prompt the prosecution to dismiss rather than disclose. "People try-




A. Defense Practitioner's Guidelines
The following guidelines can be used to safeguard a defendant's
interests, as well as to ensure that the Montgomery procedural require-
ments260 are met.
At the earliest opportunity in any evidentiary hearing, the de-
fense counsel should request the testifying officer to reveal the exact
location of the surveillance post. When the official information privi-
lege is invoked, counsel should then request an in camera hearing to
determine if the privilege is justified.
Counsel should propose questions to be asked at the in camera
hearing. Some helpful questions may include: 261 Is the location being
used in on-going investigations? Would the safety of officers and/or
private citizens be compromised by disclosure of the location? Did the
officer videotape the transaction or photograph the view from the sur-
veillance point to the defendant's location (or vice versa)? If not, is
there anything that would prevent that from being done now?
If or when the privilege is upheld after the in camera hearing,
counsel should cross-examine the officer to elicit as much information
as possible regarding the location. Some helpful questions may in-
clude:2 62 What was the distance between the officer and the alleged
drug transaction? Was the officer at ground level or elevated? What
direction was the officer facing vis-A-vis the defendant? Was the officer
using a vision-enhancing device, such as binoculars? What time of day
was it? What kind of lighting was available? Was the officer looking
through anything, such as a window or fence, when she made the ob-
servations? What was the defendant wearing? How many people were
in the area? Exactly where were they in relation to the defendant?
How many and how frequently did people pass through the area?
Where exactly was the defendant? Did the defendant move? If so, to
where and for how long? Did the officer ever lose sight of the defen-
dant? What exactly was the defendant doing throughout the surveil-
lance? How long did the surveillance last? What exactly did the other
person(s) engaged in the transaction do? If applicable, what color,
size and shape was the object exchanged? Were there any trees, tele-
phone poles, mailboxes, parked cars, fences, etc., between the of-
260. See People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 784-86 (1988).
261. Questions furnished by Rebecca Marcus, Deputy Public Defender for the San
Francisco Public Defender's Office.
262. See id.
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ficer's line of sight and the defendant, or anywhere near the
defendant? When and who arrested the defendant? Was a two-way ra-
dio used to transmit details? Was a pager, cell phone, or cash recov-
ered from the defendant?
In addition, counsel should move to strike the officer's testimony
on grounds that the exercise of the official information privilege vio-
lated the defendant's confrontation rights under the Sixth Amend-
ment by preventing cross-examination of an adverse witness on a
material issue. In preparation for a section 995 motion to dismiss
charges, counsel should request that the record of the in camera hear-
ing be transcribed and sent under seal to the judge ruling on the mo-
tion in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.
Defense counsel can also request alternatives to nondisclosure.
Alternatives may include: Providing photographs or videotapes of the
location area for the judge to use in her materiality determination.
Requesting the judge visit the area under similar conditions. Request-
ing participation (by the attorney or an investigator) in the in camera
hearing subject to the condition of nondisclosure to the client.
B. Proposal
Despite the existence of nearly identical facts, one court may re-
quire disclosure in a surveillance case while another court might sus-
tain the privilege, as evidenced by Hines and Sergio. To resolve the
inherent inequities in the materiality standard and the inconsistencies
in the application of the surveillance privilege, the California Su-
preme Court must decide which standard is appropriate and articu-
late the proper procedures. As Hines has been the only case to require
disclosure on the merits since the courts extended the official infor-
mation privilege to surveillance cases in 1988, one could argue that
the current de facto standard requires nondisclosure unless all possi-
ble locations were obstructed. A standard requiring disclosure in all
cases where there was at least one obstructed location would be as
equally unjust as the current standard, which results in nondisclosure
in almost all cases when the officer testifies that he had an unob-
structed view. The right to confrontation and cross-examination de-
mands a less severe standard. Public interest must be weighed but not
to the point of abrogating the defendant's Constitutional rights.
The Hines-Montgomery standard, requiring disclosure if it is mate-
rial to guilt or innocence, is most equitable to defendants. This stan-
dard retains the court's discretion, yet allows disclosure when the
location is material to a fair defense. The Haider-Garza-Sergio standard
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requires the defense to show the officer was making his observation
from an obstructed location and that there is a reasonable possibility
that disclosure would be material to guilt or innocence, which might
result in exoneration. This standard delivers the most discretion to
the court, but compelling the defendant to show that the officer was
making his observations from an obstructed location calls for a level of
prescience that does not exist. A more practical standard would re-
quire the defense to show that that officer may have observed the
transaction from an obstructed location and that disclosure would be
material to a fair trial. In addition, or as an alternative, elimination of
the requirement that the disclosure would result in the defendant's
exoneration would also improve the prospects of a defendant receiv-
ing a fair trial. This modified standard would put more pressure on
the government to justify their rationale for nondisclosure.
Procedures used in applying the surveillance privilege could be
improved with minimal effort from the court. The in camera hearing
should be bilateral so that the defense counsel can participate, and
may be conducted with a requirement that information not be dis-
closed. The defense counsel is the party in the best position to deter-
mine if the surveillance site is material to the defendant's case and
may make inquiries not conceived of by the court. At a minimum, the
in camera hearing should be conducted in such a way that the burden
could shift to the defense to rebut the public interest arguments. The
court could also preserve meaningful appellate review by exercising
the discretion it already possesses in the form of requiring alternatives
to disclosure. Even if not shared with the defense, the court could
require the prosecution to produce videotape or photographs, taken
from the surveillance in order to make a more informed decision.
Conclusion
"[S]ince the Government which prosecutes an accused also has
the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to
undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to
deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his de-
fense."2 63 In a surveillance case, it is the government who selects the
site, the government who prosecutes the case, and the government
who deprives the defendant of the information needed to undertake a
fair defense. The time has come for the California Supreme Court to
resolve the inconsistencies which have manifested in the surveillance
post privilege.
263. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
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